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FROM A PRESTIGE FLEET TO THE JEUNE ÉCOLE
 The latter half of the mid-nineteenth century was a period of tremendous and continuous naval transformation—much like the current time� In many 
ways, twenty-first-century politicians and admirals are arguing in a climate of 
uncertainty reminiscent of that surrounding the debates that took place in those 
earlier years� As today, authorities then sought to conciliate conflicting views 
shaped by the rapid introduction of expensive technologies at sea, the rise of 
new contenders seeking to challenge the dominating naval power through direct 
competition or asymmetric warfare, and the ongoing competition for funding 
among military services that could not agree on a common strategy to face dif-
ferent enemies�
These parallels are not a new idea, and several authors have explored this 
theme in past years, such as renowned British historian Paul M� Kennedy, who 
recently published an updated version of his 1976 
classic, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 
with a lengthy foreword that links past with pres-
ent most effectively�1 Other works often compare 
the travails of Great Britain then and the United 
States today, and replace Germany with China as 
the rising competitor� Much can be gained from 
the study of this analogy; but it also can be overly 
reductionist, as others have argued�2
It is in this context that the study of France’s 
naval experience during that period, somewhat 
neglected in the English-language literature in 
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recent years except for Norwegian author Arne Røksund’s 2007 volume on the 
Jeune École, offers an alternative source of relevant insight�3 Napoleon III pro-
claimed an egotistical Second Empire in 1852, only to see it go down to humili-
ating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71� From the ashes of empire 
arose the Third Republic, but the latter would suffer its own dramatic loss of face 
as a result of France’s last major diplomatic confrontation with Great Britain, the 
Fashoda crisis of 1898�
Within that time span, France initially proved capable of leveraging the 
extraordinary technological revolution then under way to assemble a potent 
naval force, second only to that of its nemesis, the Royal Navy (RN)� Even as the 
French force grew in size and complexity, it often was described as the emperor’s 
“prestige fleet”; without a defined strategy, it seemed unable to contribute to 
the defense of the nation in 1870� Under the Third Republic, proponents of the 
Jeune École first formulated a strategy founded on these same technological 
advances to shape a different fleet, one trumpeted as being capable of under-
mining Great Britain’s superiority at sea through what would be labeled asym-
metry today� This policy also proved flawed, as the Marine nationale failed to 
make a difference during the 1898 confrontation on the upper reaches of the 
Nile River�4
The period in question illustrates the requirement for naval policy and strat-
egy to be coordinated closely and founded on a realistic appraisal of a country’s 
security and foreign policy needs; an objective assessment of the technologies 
available; and the careful acquisition of naval advice whose independence from 
national politics and party affiliation is preserved, so that enduring political sup-
port for a single, long-term shipbuilding program can be secured� This article 
will show that the naval policy pursued under the Second Empire generated a 
viable, balanced fleet, but lack of a clearly formulated strategic purpose seemingly 
left it irrelevant during France’s hour of greatest need� The Jeune École then put 
a narrow strategy ahead of the practical limitations that any viable policy must 
take into account when funding the building of a fleet� Both approaches failed, 
leaving a bitter legacy that greatly affected France’s ability to leverage sea power 
to mitigate its difficult position on the eve of the First World War�
First, though, this article must review earlier naval developments, shaped 
as they were by those same effervescent technological developments at sea and 
contrasting geopolitical ambitions on land that would continue to affect French 
naval thought for the remainder of the nineteenth century� In the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, technical achievements and developments on the international 
scene quickly persuaded the country’s leadership of the importance of sea power, 
but debates over the shape this instrument should take endured through the 
remainder of the century�
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FROM ONE EMPEROR TO THE NEXT
French inventors of varied backgrounds often took the lead in developing the 
technologies that came to revolutionize war at sea in the decades that followed 
the downfall of Emperor Napoleon I� By far the most transformational element 
during that early period was the use of steam for propulsion, to escape the vaga-
ries of wind power� In 1824, engineer Jean Baptiste Marestier traveled overseas 
to study this potent tool and published a monograph that was well ahead of its 
time, A Memoir on Steamboats of the United States of America�5 The naval budget 
of 1826 included funds for building four vessels to experiment with steam pro-
pulsion, and France’s first successful steam warship, the 910-ton paddle steamer 
Sphinx, was launched in 1829�6 Inventor Pierre Sauvage then patented the propel-
ler, whose placement below the waterline at the stern of the vessel alleviated the 
disadvantages of having large paddle wheels affixed to a ship’s sides; the concept 
was tested with the construction of the dispatch vessel Le Corse in 1843�7 Such 
tremendous progress led to the launch of Napoléon in 1850, the first purpose-
built steam battleship in the world and the lead ship of a class of nine such ves-
sels built over the following decade� Napoléon carried ninety guns and used the 
combination of steam and propeller to reach a speed of fourteen knots (while 
keeping a sail and rigging as a secondary means of propulsion for economical 
long-distance cruising)�8
In parallel with these technological advances, events on the world scene fol-
lowing the Bourbon Restoration of 1815 convinced France’s political leadership 
of the necessity to rebuild a credible navy� Spikes of instability and low-level 
conflicts flared up frequently as a result of the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire 
and of Spain, necessitating intervention by warships to defend French interests in 
Europe and overseas� A military revolt in Cádiz prompted Paris to dispatch army 
and naval forces to Spain in 1823 to support the Bourbon king Ferdinand VII, 
while taking the side of the insurgents against the Ottomans during the Greek 
War of Independence in 1821–30�9 France maintained naval forces in the Levant 
throughout these years, even forming a combined fleet with Great Britain and 
Russia that destroyed a Turkish-Egyptian force anchored in the Bay of Navarino 
in 1827, the last major naval battle of the sail era�10 Paris also dispatched naval 
vessels in 1831 during civil unrest in Portugal and to Ancona, on Italy’s Adriatic 
coast, because of fighting among Italian nationalists, Austrian troops, and the 
Papal States�11
Spanish withdrawal from South America and the Caribbean, as well as the 
degeneration of Ottoman influence in North Africa, led to repeated naval ex-
peditions to tame virulent piracy through the reigns of French kings Charles X 
(1824–30) and Louis Philippe (1830–48)� These often included punitive raids 
against cities and local potentates who provided safe havens to the pirates�
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In the case of Algeria, such raids failed to provide a permanent solution to the 
threat the Barbary corsairs posed, leading to the occupation of Algiers in 1830 
and the eventual annexation of the entire Algerian coast over the course of the 
following decade� The expedition against Algiers was especially noteworthy, as it 
constituted the largest amphibious operation conducted during the age of sail� A 
fleet of thirty-five major warships and three hundred transports (including seven 
steamships used to tow smaller vessels to shore) landed an expeditionary force 
of 37,000 men near the coastal town of Sidi Ferruch (now Sidi Fredj) on June 14, 
1830� This action, and the effective naval bombardment delivered to support the 
attack against Algiers two weeks later, as well as the considerable logistical effort 
required to sustain the expeditionary force from the sea through the following 
months, showed the impressive level of professionalism and growing reach of La 
Royale�12
Such reach was demonstrated further as French explorers continued map-
ping out the Indian and Pacific Oceans and annexing new possessions along the 
way, from the Comoros off the eastern coast of Africa to the islands that would 
become French Polynesia, while securing a foothold in Madagascar and greater 
access to China through the Treaty of Whampoa in 1845�13
Nevertheless, the limits of French sea power in that era were exposed clearly 
whenever it clashed with British benevolence, as would be demonstrated in 1839 
and again in 1840� In the first instance, a French merchant had claimed prop-
erty damages incurred during the civil unrest that plagued the early years of the 
Mexican Republic, but failed to obtain compensation� Using this as a casus belli, 
France dispatched a naval force to occupy Veracruz in December 1838; French 
ships also enforced a blockade of the ports on the Gulf of Mexico� However, the 
local authorities still refused to pay compensation� As the crisis dragged into 
1839, Great Britain grew concerned about the resulting instability and the true 
extent of French ambitions in the region� An RN squadron arrived on the scene 
that March and soon forced a diplomatic resolution through an implied threat to 
both parties� Mexico blinked first and agreed to pay�14 This apparent success of 
France on behalf of its aggrieved citizen proved misleading, as it was British sea 
power that actually resolved the standoff, while the French squadron would not 
have been able to resist effectively had London favored Mexico in the dispute�
The limit of French influence was again in evidence the following year, during 
the so-called Near East crisis of 1840� Although nominally subservient to the Ot-
toman Empire, Muhammad Ali Pasha had consolidated his personal power over 
Egypt through the previous decades� He then undertook a military campaign to 
move into those territories corresponding to today’s Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, 
and Syria� These actions benefited from the support of France, which provided 
naval and military instructors to the budding Egyptian army and navy in a bid to 
Winter2018Review.indb   96 11/1/17   9:56 AM
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7
 C A N U E L  9 7
grow French influence in the Middle East� This scheme backfired dramatically 
when Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the Convention for the 
Pacification of the Levant (known as the Convention of London) in July 1840 to 
guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire� When Muhammad Ali refused to 
recognize the treaty, the European powers dispatched a naval force that blockad-
ed Egypt, neutralized his fleet, and expelled his troops from Syria and Lebanon, 
leaving him in control of only the province of Acre (Israel and Palestine)�15 With 
France isolated within the Concert of Europe and unable to mobilize sufficient 
naval strength to support its Egyptian protégé, Paris could only acquiesce in the 
fait accompli, despite considerable outcry from the French public�
The thirty years following the Bourbon Restoration thus had witnessed a re-
surgence of the French navy, a renewal that provided successive French monarchs 
with a potent instrument that often succeeded in influencing events in Europe 
and overseas, within the larger framework of Pax Britannica� Nevertheless, the 
events of 1839 in Mexico and 1840 in the Middle East had shown clearly the lim-
its of that same fleet, particularly in view of Great Britain’s continued superiority 
in traditional ships of the line� The trauma of the Near East crisis gave renewed 
impetus to those who perceived that fast-evolving technologies should be lever-
aged to circumvent the Royal Navy’s supremacy at sea�16 Instead of attempting to 
narrow the gap in terms of the classical sailing man-of-war, France perhaps could 
initiate new building plans to launch increased numbers of steam-propelled war-
ships that would make the British fleet obsolete at once and allow France to seize 
the lead�
The proponents of such views came to be called the “Modernists” or the 
“Materialists�” They claimed that material superiority of technical means would 
trump simple quantity in numbers of ships of the line and those strategic factors 
that historically had conferred an undue advantage on Great Britain, the island 
nation, over France, the continental power with exposed coastlines and vulner-
able colonies�
This discourse was particularly timely in view of France’s frail economy at 
the time; it was in no condition to subsidize the building of capital ships on a 
scale that would threaten Britain’s numerical lead� The failing monarchy of Louis 
Philippe actually had to cut naval estimates in 1837 and directed that twenty of 
the navy’s forty ships of the line be kept in reserve, as their timber would stay 
preserved better ashore on the building ways than afloat� The experiences of 
1839 and 1840, though, demonstrated that readying the ships for sea, mustering 
and training the required crews, and acquiring the necessary stores to support 
them could not be completed in a timely manner when faced with an unexpected 
crisis�17
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Following the fall of the government of Adolphe Thiers over the Near East 
crisis, further public outcry led to the convening in 1844 of a special commission 
to study the use of steam technology at sea�18 This venue provided great impe-
tus for the Materialists to promote their views, openly seeking “near equality to 
England in number of ships and superiority in technical skills�”19 The commis-
sion endorsed such ambitions and King Louis Philippe agreed to subsidize this 
plan through a large increase to navy estimates in 1846–47� This led to a “French 
naval scare” in Great Britain and its rapid construction of new steam warships to 
remain ahead of France�20
Although the February 1848 revolution in Paris and the ensuing instability 
under the short-lived Second Republic impeded the growth of the French navy, 
important resources continued to be dedicated to the construction of warships, 
including the previously mentioned Napoléon, launched in 1850�21 By the time 
Napoleon III proclaimed the Second Empire in December 1852, he already had 
encouraged the growth of La Royale and gained important support in promoting 
a modern navy capable of rivaling Great Britain’s�22 It remained to be seen what 
use France could make of such an instrument as the emperor set about reassert-
ing French influence in Europe and overseas�
NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE SECOND EMPIRE
Intent on renewing France’s imperial glory but aware of the limits of military 
power for achieving a dominant stature in Europe, Napoleon III embarked on a 
bold program structured around three pillars�23
First, despite the economic recession of the previous decade, France grew 
prosperous through the 1850s as domestic industries were driven to modern-
ize and leverage new efficiencies gained through the advances of the industrial 
age� Although he proclaimed an imperial regime, the new monarch was careful 
to nurture a free economy based largely on the liberal tenets of the time� This 
made goods from France increasingly competitive on world markets, leading to 
the development of considerable economic interests overseas as French business 
acquired larger market shares around the world�24
This economic growth paralleled a renewed interest in colonial expansion, the 
second pillar of the emperor’s program�25 France may have lost its most prized 
possessions during the Napoleonic Wars but had managed to retain footholds 
around the periphery of the British Empire and gained new possessions during 
the following decades, from North Africa to the Pacific� Napoleon III sought 
further expansion through the 1850s and 1860s, carefully encroaching on those 
territories that did not involve direct confrontation with other European powers, 
such as in Southeast Asia and western Africa� Public support for such endeavors 
grew through these years as successive governments emphasized the community 
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of interests between the economic gains the Right sought and the noble purpose 
of France’s mission civilisatrice, which was more palatable to the Left�
This imperial renaissance required a third pillar: naval forces to protect French 
territories and interests around the world� Stability on the European continent 
left the country’s land borders momentarily secured, allowing Napoleon III to 
dedicate much attention to his navy as he sought the next opportunity to dem-
onstrate that France had regained a place of influence within the Concert of 
Europe� Another crisis related to the decline of the Ottoman Empire provided 
just that� A seemingly insignificant dispute between France and Russia over the 
responsibility to be “Protector of the Christians in the Holy Land” left Ottoman 
leaders equivocating about which of the two countries would retain this nominal 
title� Tsar Nicholas I used the opportunity simultaneously to challenge the grow-
ing influence of France in Constantinople and to raise anew a long-standing 
demand for access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits� A first ulti-
matum conveyed from Saint Petersburg in February 1853 demanded the ceding 
of all provinces between the Danube and the Dardanelles, free access through 
the straits, and the protection of all Turkish Christian minorities� Confident 
of the support of the other European powers, the Ottoman rulers ignored this 
challenge—and the diplomatic crisis led to war�26
While England and France did not join the conflict immediately, they were 
sufficiently concerned about Russian ambitions to dispatch naval forces to the 
Levant once again� The ships made their way up to Constantinople in a show 
of force, but Russia was undeterred, having already destroyed the Turkish Black 
Sea fleet anchored in the Anatolian port of Sinope in November 1853 while Rus-
sian armies advanced across the Danube and into eastern Anatolia�27 Napoleon 
III grew increasingly strident about an intervention to succor the “sick man of 
Europe,” and Great Britain agreed to join France in declaring war against tsarist 
Russia in April 1854� Additional naval squadrons were dispatched promptly and 
expeditionary forces were embarked in British and French transports� Within 
months, the coalition had secured control of the Black Sea, blockading the Rus-
sian squadron in the fortress of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula and repeat-
edly bombarding the city of Odessa�28
After a first foray ashore in June to stop the Russian offensive through Bul-
garia, the combined expeditionary force was reembarked and landed in Septem-
ber 1854 to lay siege to Sevastopol itself� The remainder of the land campaign 
became bogged down, and poor logistics combined with dismal sanitary condi-
tions ashore to inflict a dire cost on the expeditionary force� The reputations of 
both the French and British armies suffered greatly as a result of their lackluster 
performance�29
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Nonetheless, after hostilities came to an end in March 1856, La Royale could 
boast of several achievements�30 Napoleon III’s navy had acted as an equal to the 
Royal Navy during several naval and joint operations, from securing command 
of the Black Sea to transporting an expeditionary force of 28,000 men to the 
theater of operations, successfully landing it first in Bulgaria and then outside 
Sevastopol� The French navy was able to supply this force from the sea for two 
years while keeping the tsarist fleet bottled up in port and providing effective fire 
support to troops on land� Naval operations also took place along the periphery 
of the Russian Empire, with smaller squadrons deployed in the Baltic and the 
Pacific�31 These operations may not have affected hostilities in Crimea directly, 
but they did result in Russia dispersing forces that were needed badly on the main 
front� European politicians and strategists, especially in Great Britain, took note 
of the French ability to operate large naval forces globally�32
The war left the French navy in an enviable position� It was the object of impe-
rial pride for Napoleon III, while political circles and public opinion supported 
continued investment in the fleet� Increased budgets were approved, allowing 
naval architects to integrate lessons from the Crimean War into new ship de-
signs that reflected the trinity of steam, the explosive shell, and armor plating� 
France again took the technical lead and began work on the first oceangoing 
ironclad, La Gloire�33 The new line of ships that followed was but one element 
of a balanced force that was funded through the unprecedented naval estimates 
of 1857� This milestone measure provided for “three fleets: one of battleships to 
uphold France’s position in Europe, one of ships for foreign stations to make her 
respected abroad, and one of transports and gunboats either to conduct colonial 
expeditions or to land and support troops in another Crimean War�”34 This pro-
gram envisioned the building of forty ironclads; twenty armored frigates; ninety 
corvettes, gunboats, and other auxiliary units; and seventy-five troop transports 
capable of embarking forty thousand men and twelve thousand horses�35
However, this naval renaissance came to naught over the course of the follow-
ing decade� It remained shaped by preparations for a confrontation with Great 
Britain� The French navy continued to seek near equality in numbers, superior 
fighting efficiency, and the bold adoption of every technical innovation at sea 
to gain even a limited advantage over the Royal Navy�36 Although France was 
successful in repeatedly achieving technical superiority in the areas of steam 
propulsion, naval gunnery, and ship’s side armor, each instance only gave rise to 
another race—which the Royal Navy set about winning� Once Britain’s leaders 
abandoned their affiliation with sail and the government allocated the required 
funds, the country easily achieved a commanding lead in new construction by 
the mid-1860s� Even the vainglorious Napoleon III had to admit that maintain-
ing near parity was beyond French means, and the 1857 plan was scaled down in 
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1863 and again in 1865�37 As for the fighting efficiency of French sailors over their 
British counterparts, their grit was never tested during the years of the Second 
Empire� Although La Royale continued preparing for a decisive engagement with 
the Royal Navy, this did not come to pass, as a much more dangerous threat took 
shape on the Continent, making the French navy seemingly irrelevant during the 
country’s hour of greatest need�
1870: NEITHER VICTORIOUS NOR DEFEATED
The French amirauté (admiralty) was ill prepared for the coming war� Focused 
on the competition with Great Britain and expansion overseas, it had dedicated 
little intellectual effort to figuring out how to leverage sea power against Prussia� 
The Marine impériale benefited from an overwhelming preponderance over the 
fledgling Norddeutsche Bundesmarine (North German Confederation Navy), 
formed in 1867� France could deploy some four hundred vessels (including 
thirty-four ironclads) crewed by 28,000 men, while Prussia and its allies could 
muster only 6,200 sailors manning thirty-four vessels, of which only five could 
be considered seagoing ironclads�38
Such superiority would be of little use, however, unless it could be employed 
effectively against the enemy, and the French quickly elaborated naval plans to do 
just that� They sought to defeat ironclads at sea, raid the naval bases at Wilhelms-
haven on the North Sea and Kiel in the Baltic, blockade commercial ports and 
destroy shipping overseas, and land an army corps on the northern coast of the 
North German Confederation to relieve pressure on the main land front�39
Such objectives may have appeared sound at the time, but they were based 
on flawed assumptions� Once war came, the Confederation Navy stayed in port, 
denying French admirals the opportunity to destroy enemy capital ships—the 
ironclads—through battle at sea� Raids against Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were 
considered, but new technologies such as marine mines and torpedoes launched 
from shore, combined with formidable coastal batteries, made such expeditions 
too risky� French ships were more successful in blockading enemy cruisers iso-
lated in neutral ports overseas, but the interdiction of commercial shipping was 
undermined greatly by France’s reluctance to stop those ships that sailed under 
the red ensign (flown by British merchant vessels), fearing to alienate Great Brit-
ain� Lastly, prewar studies had concluded that amphibious operations against the 
enemy coast could take place only in the Baltic, in view of the extensive shallows 
along the North Sea shore� Such an expedition, in turn, would require an active 
alliance with Denmark, or at least its benevolent neutrality—neither of which was 
forthcoming during the hostilities�40
Worst, though, was that all these contingencies presupposed the readiness 
of the French fleet to undertake such operations at the beginning of hostilities 
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in 1870, but this was not the case� When Prince Otto von Bismarck, minister- 
president of the Kingdom of Prussia and chancellor of the North German Con-
federation, succeeded in goading Napoleon III into declaring war on July 19, 
French naval leaders were caught unprepared to launch large-scale operations� 
Many ships were in refit, while others remained deployed overseas; large num-
bers of reservists were unavailable, as they already had sailed for the summer 
Newfoundland fisheries; and orders for the required stocks of coal, food, and 
other supplies had yet to be fulfilled� These challenges, compounded by the deci-
sion to maintain large forces in the Mediterranean to guard transports ferrying 
troops from Algeria to the métropole despite the obvious absence of a German 
threat in that theater, directly led to the failure to intercept enemy ironclads re-
turning home that summer after an extensive maintenance period contracted to 
British firms�41
The French fleet eventually conducted two large-scale demonstrations off the 
German coast, but they achieved little, and the single naval battle of the war was 
an inconclusive engagement between two small gunboats (the French Bouvet and 
the German Meteor) near Cuba in November�42 As the French army crumbled 
and Napoleon III surrendered at Sedan, the fleet was ordered back to Cherbourg 
in September to land its heavy guns for the defense of Paris� This was an inglori-
ous end to the naval war, although French sailors would distinguish themselves 
ashore in the following months�43
FROM THE SECOND EMPIRE TO THE THIRD REPUBLIC
Following an armistice in January 1871, the French government agreed to the 
terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt on May 10� The Second Empire already had 
given way to the Third Republic by then, following a populist coup in September 
1870, but the monarchist Adolphe Thiers—the premier who had resigned in the 
wake of the Near East crisis of 1840—eventually formed a provisional cabinet of 
conservative, rural, middle-class politicians in February 1871� Priority went to 
repaying the war indemnity, to put an end to the German occupation�44
Meanwhile, a climate of revanchisme quickly seized France, so the military 
leadership set about rebuilding the French army—and studying the lessons from 
the preceding conflict�45 Despite the exceptional performance of the navy’s of-
ficers and sailors ashore, the service’s future and its very raison d’être came under 
close scrutiny at the time� In the wake of the navy’s inability to contribute to the 
defense of the nation, many denounced the fleet as a mere instrument of imperial 
prestige and challenged the legitimacy of continued investment in ships� Even 
Thiers’s ministre de la marine, retired admiral Louis Pothuau, lamented that “[a]ll 
our efforts must be concentrated on land� Indeed, what good will a navy be to 
us now?”46 This context gave rise to several radical proposals� Some promoted 
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the liquidation of all naval assets except those required for close coastal defense� 
Others sought to retain just a few sailing ships to train personnel who would be 
mobilized in the event of war to man a fleet of commerce destroyers improvised 
from existing merchant vessels�47
Nevertheless, Pothuau was able in 1872 to deliver naval estimates along 
more conservative lines, shaping the Marine nationale for the next two decades� 
Although the budget was cut dramatically from 210 to 146 million francs and 
severely curtailed the original building plan of 1857, the program of 1872 still 
envisioned a fleet of 215 ships—namely, twenty-six ironclad battleships, thirty-
four cruisers, twenty coastal-defense ships, eighteen corvettes, thirty-two gun-
boats, twenty-five troop transports, and sixty auxiliary vessels�48 While a pale 
reflection of Napoleon III’s ambition to build a navy of 430 ships, this mix did 
reflect a remarkable continuity in seeking a balanced force that encompassed 
units of the line for fleet engagements, cruisers and gunboats for overseas work, 
and troop transports for amphibious operations� Such a construct was required 
to pursue the obligations that Minister Pothuau envisioned in 1872: maintain a 
battle and training fleet at home (the Squadron of Evolutions), defend stations 
overseas, renew the fleet’s material readiness, and sustain schools ashore to con-
tinue generating officers and sailors trained in the technical skills that modern 
warfare required�49
This plan showed some willingness to take into account lessons learned from 
past conflicts, such as the continued requirement for troop transports that had 
become evident during the Crimean War, and to acknowledge contemporary 
practicalities, such as the necessity for a colonial power with worldwide interests 
to deploy long-range cruisers and smaller gunboats� Nevertheless, most senior 
officers continued to posit that any future confrontation at sea would take the 
shape of a Nelsonian engagement between massed fleets in a replay of Trafalgar, 
regardless of the technical innovations that had occurred since 1805� Some earlier 
authors—namely, Baron Pierre-Barthélémy Portal (minister for the navy and the 
colonies, 1818–21) and Vice Admiral Jean-Baptiste Grivel, in the 1830s—had 
professed their belief in guerre de course (commerce warfare) as a viable alterna-
tive to seeking an engagement with the Royal Navy’s main battle fleet, but few 
championed this approach in the early days of the Third Republic�50
After the Thiers government relinquished power in 1873, the program of 1872 
was pursued haphazardly even as the British navy was gaining strength from the 
building plans initiated in the 1860s�51 Meanwhile, Russia as well as Germany 
and newly unified Italy launched extensive shipbuilding programs that sought 
to incorporate the latest technological innovations and lessons learned from the 
recent American Civil War; they all rapidly whittled away at France’s advantage 
in modern warships�52
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The context was ripe for a new strategy that sought to move beyond the Nelso-
nian tradition by leveraging technological innovations to allow France to resume 
its position as an influential continental power even as it faced an array of new 
opponents at sea� But it remained to be seen who would seize this opportunity�
THE RISE OF THE JEUNE ÉCOLE . . .
The French Materialists of the 1840s had sought but failed to define a strategy 
that would shake Great Britain’s command of the sea through technological 
advances� One author eventually commented on the potential for technology 
to undermine such numerical superiority in a new way, promoting a form of 
asymmetric warfare and laying the foundation for what would mature into the 
Jeune École in the following decades� Captain Baron Richild Grivel, son of the 
previously mentioned Vice Admiral Grivel, in 1869 published an important essay 
built on two fundamental assertions� First, the French historical experience had 
shown that great encounters between battle fleets represented a severe danger to 
the weaker naval power� Second, the French navy did not face one kind of enemy 
but two, in that in the future it likely would be called on to confront a powerful 
Great Britain on the one hand and continental powers, weaker in terms of naval 
strength, on the other� Building a fleet solely dedicated to challenging RN com-
mand of the sea was futile� The Marine nationale should be organized to confront 
the navies of those weaker powers through fleet engagements and undermine 
England’s command of the sea through commerce raiding�53 Such a proposition 
was not that revolutionary in and of itself, but it did underline a critical vulner-
ability for Great Britain, as Arne Røksund covered so well in his 2007 study, The 
Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak�
Grivel concluded that, instead of attacking Britain’s strongest point—the twenty 
thousand cannon of the Royal Navy—France should aim for its weak spot—the 
fifty thousand merchant vessels transporting the riches on which British prosper-
ity depended� He argued that this was a form of warfare in which France would be 
able to engage for an indefinite period; however, it was not likely that this cruiser 
warfare would have to last longer than a couple of years, since most certainly it 
would lead to a substantial rise in insurance rates, and after two or three years 
no one would entrust goods to British ships� Britain’s principal source of national 
wealth would dry up�54
In the 1870s, this proposal was explored further by another serving naval of-
ficer, Captain Théophile Aube, who would rise to the rank of admiral and imple-
ment his ideas as ministre de la marine a decade later� He took Grivel’s emphasis 
on commerce warfare one step further by dethroning the ship of the line as the 
foundation of naval power� He described a future when technological advances 
would slow down and fleets would mature to a steady state, somewhat akin to the 
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latter part of the age of sail� All naval powers eventually would achieve the same 
level of technological development and qualitative readiness, reaching a stage 
in which in any given conflict one fleet’s superiority would be obvious solely on 
the basis of numbers� As the weaker side then would not risk its battleships, the 
guerre d’escadre (fleet engagement) would be obsolete�55 Aube was also a fervent 
colonialist who believed that the strength of nations would depend on their 
overseas possessions� Hence, while accepting, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian 
War, the requirement to rebuild the army to secure the country’s land borders, he 
proposed that guerre de course would be key to maintaining access to colonies 
and severing an enemy’s link to such resources overseas, be it a maritime or con-
tinental power� This train of thought eventually caused Aube, unlike Grivel, to 
posit that commerce warfare would constitute the strategy of choice against both 
superior and inferior naval powers, and that the humble torpedo boat would be 
the new “capital ship�”56
This approach came to be known as the Jeune École, the “Young School,” 
as its proponents were often those younger officers willing to challenge their 
seniors who appeared to stand for the status quo and the primacy of the ship 
of the line� The debate grew through the late 1870s and into the 1880s as most 
navies, including those of France and Great Britain, acquired torpedo boats and 
fast cruisers that prioritized speed and quick-firing armament over armor and 
heavy guns� Advocates of the torpedo boat were encouraged greatly by the initial 
success of these craft during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, especially when 
a Russian force conducted the first recorded engagement of enemy vessels with 
ship-launched, self-propelled torpedoes in January 1877�57 Further success en-
sued when two torpedo boats joined France’s Far East Squadron, commanded by 
Admiral Amédée Courbet, then engaged in the Sino-French War of 1884–85�58 
The hostilities (resulting from the clash of influence between the two powers over 
Vietnam) were marked by several engagements in which torpedo boats played 
some role and inflicted actual damages on modern Chinese ironclads acquired 
from European yards�
Proponents of the Jeune École seized on these isolated episodes as they took 
the debate over the future of the French navy to the public� Publicists and radical 
pamphleteers, such as journalist Gabriel Charmes, built on the academic work of 
serving and retired officers to vilify the naval hierarchy for the apparent short-
comings of 1870� They also denounced the reluctance of the powers that be to 
endorse new technologies and fashion a revolutionary doctrine that would sup-
port French policies better on the Continent and overseas�59
The Concert of Europe had crumbled in the wake of the Franco-Prussian 
War and Germany’s imperial ambitions signaled a renewed scramble for colo-
nies� The race for territories greatly increased tensions between France and its 
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continental neighbors (particularly Germany and Italy), as well as with Great 
Britain� Public debate in France reached such a crescendo that it again caused a 
naval scare across the Channel� The British government resigned itself to another 
round of expensive shipbuilding in 1884—including that of a large number of 
torpedo boats to fill the gap with France—and in the Naval Defence Act of 1889 
announced its intention to maintain a two-power standard�60
The naval debate in France took on a unique dimension as it became com-
plicated by the political fractures that plagued the Third Republic� During the 
1870s, as the presidency passed from Thiers to army marshal Patrice de Mac-
Mahon (in power from 1873 to 1879), successive cabinets had grown increasingly 
conservative and promonarchical� However, the Left ultimately rebounded and 
gained sufficient seats in the National Assembly to govern for most of the 1880s, 
engaging in a wide range of reforms that affected all facets of French society�61 
The reformist wave eventually reached the Marine nationale through the as-
sembly’s Budget Committee, where republican deputies, led by Étienne Lamy, 
militated for remodeling the navy’s administration, its personnel policies, and 
eventually its overall strategy�62 Officers of the Jeune École saw this as an opportu-
nity to promote their views� They allied themselves with radical deputies, passing 
on position papers and selective information on technological advances, often 
covertly� Meanwhile, Charmes and other publicists attended meetings of the 
committee to promote their views� The discourse from the Left became increas-
ingly strident, to the point of identifying the battleship as a symbol of a timorous 
naval leadership that was repressive of sailors, while painting the torpedo boat 
as an instrument better suited to promote republican ideas at home and abroad� 
Senior naval leaders reacted by moving closer to politicians of the Right�63
Several of the Budget Committee’s reforms were implemented under Auguste 
Gougeard, a retired naval captain with republican views who was appointed 
minister in 1881�64 It was under Aube, however, that the Jeune École reached its 
zenith� Ministre de la marine from January 7, 1886, to May 30, 1887, the retired 
admiral immediately ordered that all work be stopped on the construction of four 
battleships so as to concentrate on the alternative fleet he had been promoting for 
the previous fifteen years� He submitted estimates for a renewed “building pro-
gram that included six large and ten small cruisers, twenty large torpedo boats for 
use against other torpedo boats, fifty bateaux-canons, one hundred regular torpe-
do boats, and three armored coast-defence ships for use as torpedo boat mother 
ships�”65 The fleet was redistributed into three groups: the aging battle fleet was 
concentrated at Toulon, as an offensive force against the growing Italian navy; 
older torpedo craft and coastal-defense ships were assembled in Cherbourg, as 
a defensive force covering the Channel against Great Britain and Germany; and 
commerce-raiding cruisers were based at Brest, to wage guerre de course in the 
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Atlantic and beyond� In addition, funds were sought for the establishment of a 
major naval base at Bizerte, Tunisia, as well as a string of coaling stations in the 
colonies to support those commerce raiders that would deploy around the world 
in any conflict with Great Britain�
. . . AND ITS FALL
As the recognized father of the Jeune École, Aube left the department in 1887 
with his head high, having done more than anybody else in a very short time to 
lay the foundations for a renewed fleet� These foundations, though, would crum-
ble almost immediately, leaving the French navy a dysfunctional entity right up to 
the First World War� This resulted from the practical limitations of torpedo boats, 
the continued fracture of the French naval leadership along political-affiliation 
lines, and the hard realities of international relations in the 1890s�
Despite these difficult circumstances, the radicalization of his supporters, 
their more extravagant claims, and the demonization of those opposed to his 
ideas, one must recognize Aube’s intellectual probity� While dramatically alter-
ing the navy’s building plans, he ordered the conduct of les grandes manœuvres 
(large-scale exercises at sea) to test the ability of torpedo boats under realistic 
conditions and to develop doctrine and tactics for their employment, whereas 
such issues previously had been confined largely to the realm of the rhetori-
cal� He instructed the senior leadership to draft extensive lessons learned from 
these exercises, and allowed naval officers who wished to make public their first 
impressions—positive or negative—to publish them in civilian journals�66
Minister Aube first dispatched torpedo boats on a long and arduous transit 
under rough winter conditions from Cherbourg, Lorient, and Brest in the Atlan-
tic to Toulon in the Mediterranean� Summer maneuvers then were organized to 
set the torpedo boat fleet against the battleships of the Squadron of Evolutions� 
Although the government resigned in May of the following year, forcing him 
from office, Aube already had ordered for the summer of 1887 an even more 
ambitious exercise—in which groups of torpedo boats would have attempted to 
intercept a battle fleet traveling from Toulon to Brest—but his successor canceled 
it� There were no follow-on maneuvers, as objective study of such experiments 
at sea quickly was distorted to suit both supporters and opponents of the Jeune 
École along the political lines that were dividing the Marine nationale�67
It was admittedly very difficult to analyze the results of such exercises in 
any case�68 They seemed to confirm both the potential of the torpedo boat—its 
ability to use its maneuverability to close the battleship to weapon-engagement 
range—and its fundamental flaws when compared with larger units better suited 
for long-range cruising, with better sea-keeping qualities and autonomy beyond 
the few days for which a torpedo boat realistically could be expected to sustain 
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itself� As well, the maneuvers did not explore fully the potential countermeasures 
against such new craft, nor did they attempt to determine how torpedo boats 
could detect and intercept enemy warships beyond their very limited visual 
range, as the maneuvers had been controlled to ensure contact between oppos-
ing fleets�
As successive governments in Paris grew more moderate over the following 
years, the influence of the Jeune École rapidly waned, but did not disappear al-
together� The technology existed, and several of its proponents were now senior 
officers who still believed the torpedo boat offered some potential for use, on 
the basis of their interpretation of the 1886 maneuvers� Cabinet instability also 
greatly complicated the formulation of enduring policies, as no fewer than twenty 
navy ministers were appointed between December 1887 and February 1906� Each 
tried to impose his imprimatur on the institution, but seldom was in office long 
enough to secure lasting reforms�69
Meanwhile, the competition for influence in Europe and the race for colo-
nies overseas continued unabated� New coalitions took shape on the Continent 
to replace the Bismarckian order, and the powers of the Triple Alliance (Ger-
many, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) engaged in sizable shipbuilding programs� 
The growth of European battle fleets was fueled in part by the teachings of an 
American sailor and scholar, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who gathered a 
very large and enthusiastic following in the United States and Europe following 
the publication in 1890 of his classic, The Influence of Sea Power upon History�70 
This book marked the resurgence of the “historical school” and sought to affirm 
the primacy of the battleship, a concept immediately endorsed in most European 
capitals—with the exception of Paris, where controversy continued between the 
Jeune École and the partisans of the main battle line�
While domestic and international politics grew increasingly complex, the 
readiness of the French fleet declined� By 1889, eleven older, wooden-hulled, 
armor-plated ironclads still were part of the battle line, while only one cruiser 
could achieve a speed of eighteen knots; the others—legacies from the Second 
Empire shipbuilding program—could maintain fourteen knots at best, well below 
the capability of other European powers’ modern construction� Similar inferior-
ity also applied to the characteristics of endurance, range, gun caliber and rate of 
fire, and armor strength�71
This state of confusion was evident in the landmark program of 1890� Al-
though the measure annulled many of the projects Aube had promoted in 1886 
and aimed at responding to Britain’s Naval Defence Act of 1889 as well as the 
threat of the Triple Alliance, it still paid lip service to the Jeune École through 
an eclectic mix of platforms: twenty-four battleships, thirty-six cruisers, forty 
high-seas torpedo boats, fifteen coastal-defense ships, 220 smaller torpedo 
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boats, and a foreign-station fleet of thirty-four cruisers� But the construction of 
ten battleships, forty-five cruisers, and over one hundred torpedo boats over the 
next decade would have been required to bring the fleet up to such strength—and 
even this was well beyond the capacity of French shipyards� The incoherence of 
the plan was obvious, as funds for the development of a naval base at Bizerte; the 
provision of coaling stations overseas; and the construction of torpedo boat tend-
ers, or mother ships—essential elements for the conduct of commerce warfare 
overseas and torpedo boat operations beyond the coasts of France—were not in-
cluded�72 Such confusion continued in another plan crafted in 1894; in the words 
of one historian, it intended to make everybody happy, with “a few scout cruisers 
and some battleships for the admirals and a lot of torpedo craft and some special 
commerce-raiding cruisers for the Jeune École�”73
Great Britain also regained its place as France’s most likely enemy in the late 
1880s, ranking above even Germany as a result of the ongoing competition for 
colonies�74 When France’s Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand reached the isolated 
post of Fashoda (now Kodok) in southern Sudan in 1898, he soon faced a much 
larger force under British major general Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener, and 
France and Great Britain prepared for war�75
Had the confrontation turned into an armed clash on the shores of the White 
Nile, the final decision likely would have been determined at sea� The British 
strategy would have leveraged an overwhelming advantage in modern battle-
ships and cruisers simultaneously to annihilate the aging French battle fleet in the 
Mediterranean, had it dared to come out; intercept and destroy any expedition-
ary force sent from the métropole to Africa; blockade France’s ports; destroy the 
country’s commercial shipping; and mop up isolated French colonies�
In return, even under the most optimistic prognosis, while the Marine na-
tionale could have inflicted damage on those British ships blockading French 
ports close to shore and undertaken a campaign of commerce warfare overseas, 
the latter would not have exercised a real impact until well after the face-off at 
Fashoda had concluded� As for French torpedo boats, they could have conducted 
small-scale raids against the coasts of England, but these actions likely would not 
have threatened British ability to sustain forces on the upper Nile through Egypt�
Unable to support Captain Marchand in Fashoda, and fully conscious of the 
Royal Navy’s superiority in terms of numbers, matériel, and strategic disposition, 
France could only accept a humiliating diplomatic retreat� As Germany’s Kaiser 
Wilhelm II reportedly commented, “Poor France� She acknowledges herself 
beaten without a shot having been fired� That is abdication on the sea� They have 
not read their Mahan!”76 France withdrew its forces from Sudan, and Paris and 
London agreed that the watersheds of the Congo and Nile Rivers henceforth 
would divide their countries’ respective spheres of influence�77
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There followed a period of intellectual introspection� The Jeune École rapidly 
lost ground, leading to the appointment of Jean Louis de Lanessan as minister in 
1899 and the promulgation of the 1900 shipbuilding program, in which the big-
ship navy once again came to the fore� The measure mandated the construction of 
a first tranche of six modern battleships and five armored cruisers over the course 
of the following eight years�78
Lanessan did not deny the importance of smaller, faster cruisers and torpedo 
boats for specific tasks, and he promoted the establishment of “flying squadrons” 
of fast armored cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to support com-
merce raiders breaking out of French ports during an enemy blockade� He also 
encouraged the growth of a fledgling submarine capability—the 1900 program 
included requirements for twenty-six of the vessels, along with twenty-eight de-
stroyers and 112 torpedo boats�79
However, Lanessan’s promotion of a balanced fleet centered on the battleship 
took the navy back toward the time of the Second Empire, when it had cultivated 
the ability to challenge any other navy at sea� In the words of historian Arne 
Røksund, “Lanessan’s insistence on organizing the French Navy for a possible 
conflict with Great Britain was, however, not solely based on threat assessments� 
He pushed the argument one step further� He insisted that by using the most 
advanced and powerful navy of the world as a standard against which to measure 
itself, the French Navy would have nothing to fear from the navies of the Triple 
Alliance�”80
FROM FASHODA THROUGH THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Fashoda did not mark the final passing of the Jeune École in France� Indeed, a 
more left-leaning cabinet came to power in 1902 and the radical Camille Pel-
letan was installed as ministre de la marine� Until the end of his tour in office in 
1905, he canceled orders for large ships and asked for more torpedo boats�81 The 
fracture of the naval officer corps into deeply resentful factions whose members 
sought to sabotage each other’s careers and who brought their conflicting views 
to the public also continued into the decades leading to the First World War�82 
Worse, even though Pelletan’s successor, Gaston Thomson, reinstituted the fun-
damentals of the 1900 program, French shipbuilding had fallen behind in the 
naval arms race among the other European powers and the United States, which 
was proceeding at full speed� Then, even as French contractors struggled to de-
liver the ships ordered in 1900, Great Britain fundamentally revolutionized naval 
warfare by launching the “all big gun” Dreadnought in 1906� France ordered its 
first equivalent only in 1910�83
This confused state of affairs would leave France by 1914 with an inferior fleet 
that included only four dreadnoughts, compared with thirty-one for the Royal 
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Navy, twenty-one for Germany, four each for Italy and Austria, seven for Russia, 
and nine for the United States� The remainder of the French fleet amounted to 
an unsystematic assembly of disparate classes of ships limited in their ability to 
cruise and fight at sea as coherent units� Again France’s navy made only a limited 
contribution to a war, even as the nation was waging a fight to the end on the 
western front�84
Despite such strategic confusion at sea, naval policy eventually matured as a 
reflection of a more realistic appraisal of the country’s security and foreign policy 
needs, an objective assessment of the available technologies, and independence 
from the prevailing party affiliation so as to secure enduring political support� 
Accepting peaceful coexistence with Great Britain after centuries of intermittent 
conflict and relentless rivalry, France agreed to the terms of the Entente Cordiale 
in April 1904�85 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 seemed to confirm the 
continued dominance of the battleship, especially after the Nelsonian confronta-
tion at Tsushima�86 The importance of the battle fleet and the requirement for 
interoperability with the Royal Navy came to the fore when France, with active 
support from England, handily won its diplomatic confrontation with Germany 
during the First Moroccan Crisis over the status of Tangier in 1905–1906 and 
the Second Moroccan Crisis over Agadir in 1911�87 Such developments led to the 
Anglo-French Naval Convention of 1912, whereby the two powers agreed to a 
division of labor at sea� While Britain concentrated its fleet in the North Sea and 
guaranteed the French coast against naval attacks from Germany, France based 
its main fleet in the Mediterranean and assumed responsibility for the defense of 
British interests in the region, including the Suez Canal�88
France supported this commitment with an ambitious shipbuilding plan that 
the National Assembly approved in 1912� That program envisioned the construc-
tion by 1920 of twenty-eight dreadnought battleships, ten éclaireurs d’escadre 
(battle cruisers), fifty-two torpilleurs d’escadre (destroyers), ninety-four subma-
rines, and ten bâtiments pour stations lointaines (unarmored cruisers for service 
overseas)�89 France ran out of time for delivering this balanced fleet prior to the 
German offensive of August 1914, but the precedent had been set and a focused 
shipbuilding effort resumed after the First World War�
Wartime operations at sea did not negate all the precepts that the Jeune École 
had put forward during the ironclad era� As naval historian Theodore Ropp 
notes in his masterful study The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval 
Policy 1871–1904, Admiral Aube had predicted—quite presciently, in an 1882 
article—the course of a future war, elaborating that (1) the weaker fleet would 
refuse combat and remain in port, (2) the stronger one also would remain in port, 
owing to a fear of torpedoes, (3) and the only real activity at sea would be guerre 
de course, (4) under which offensive actions against merchant shipping would be 
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merciless� Ropp argues that “it is possible to view the events of the war of 1914–18 
under exactly those four points�”90 Jutland and the Dardanelles notwithstanding, 
the Hochseeflotte (German High Seas Fleet) and the British Grand Fleet stuck 
to their bases, one as a “risk fleet” in Wilhelmshaven, the other moored in Scapa 
Flow to preserve its numerical superiority� The torpedo finally came into its own 
as a strategic weapon when married with the “submersible torpedo boat,” which 
Germany unleashed in a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare�
Aube and his contemporaries were right in their intuition that technology could 
provide for the rise of a form of asymmetric warfare that would benefit the 
weaker navy, threatening the supremacy of the battle fleet and strangling vital 
lines of communications� The torpedo eventually would constitute such a threat, 
but the Jeune École erred in focusing on a delivery vehicle meant to make the 
battleship obsolete before the technology was available and proven� It was the 
German submarines of the Great War that carried the torpedoes that directly 
threatened Great Britain’s supremacy at sea, not the French torpedo boats of the 
1880s� France’s famed student of strategy Hervé Coutau-Bégarie indeed mused 
that “the fault of Aube was perhaps to be right too early�”91
Another flaw was the strident militancy of the Jeune École disciples� They 
strenuously refused to listen to their opponents, neglecting to admit that tech-
nological advances would spur not only the rise of asymmetric warfare but the 
development of defensive measures against such means, just as during the iron-
clad era the development of the explosive shell had been followed closely by that 
of armor plating� To promote their views, the disciples allied themselves to radi-
cal politicians, which deeply fractured the naval officer corps amid the cabinet 
instability that was a hallmark of the Third Republic, preventing the formulation 
and sustainment of a single, long-term shipbuilding plan� This may have been the 
greatest, if unintended, harm that the Jeune École caused, as the debate initiated 
in the 1870s contributed to the country’s poor state of readiness at sea up to the 
First World War�
This marked a very important departure from the tradition of political neu-
trality that had been observed throughout previous decades: “Ever since the 
great purges of the Revolution [of 1789], the navy had not taken part in national 
political life� The sole aim of the naval chiefs, regardless of their private political 
convictions, was to keep the navy intact, not to preserve or support a given politi-
cal order�”92 This largely explains the strength of France’s navy under Napoleon 
III� From the Bourbon Restoration through the July Monarchy and the Second 
Republic to the Second Empire, political neutrality assured continued support 
from those in power, despite the social turmoil of the early nineteenth century� 
With political will and public support in hand, French naval leaders set about 
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creating a balanced and effective force� This continuity in purpose crested with 
the 1857 shipbuilding program, which laid the foundations for Napoleon III’s 
fleet� Still derided by some historians today because it seemingly failed to make 
a viable contribution during the Franco-Prussian War, La Royale nonetheless 
served France well through the 1860s—as long as the emperor adhered to real-
istic objectives overseas and viable policies on the Continent� Even the lack of 
results at sea in 1870 cannot be blamed squarely on naval leaders� They had com-
pleted a modicum of operational planning for war with Prussia, but they could 
not have foreseen that their emperor’s diplomatic rashness and the disastrous 
land campaign would deprive the fleet of any opportunity to execute those plans�
Study of this period remains relevant today for those involved in military 
transformation during a time of geopolitical and strategic uncertainty set against 
a background of spiraling and ostensibly unaffordable technological innovations� 
Naval policy under the Second Empire proved correct, but it failed to explain 
itself to politicians and the public alike, as no cogent theoretical and doctrinal 
framework supported it� This greatly facilitated the opening of a path for “tech-
nological determinists,” such as Richild Grivel and Aube, who laid out such a 
discourse, one that promoted future technological developments to undermine 
the position of proponents of the status quo� A large part of that vision would 
prove correct in the longer term, but the immediate adoption of such a strategy 
to shape contemporary naval policy failed France because it did not provide the 
means to support the country’s current objectives� The situation was made only 
worse when the debate assumed political overtones, introducing a stridency that 
left the Marine nationale deeply divided� Shipbuilding programs repeatedly were 
altered as governments came and went, resulting at the turn of the century in an 
assembly of disparate “sample ships” in lieu of the balanced fleet achieved previ-
ously under Napoleon III�
The Second Empire and the Third Republic demonstrated in their very dis-
tinct ways that naval policy and strategy must remain closely aligned to deliver af-
fordable means in support of a country’s realistic objectives at home and abroad� 
This is an enduring lesson for today, when the future of modern navies remains 
cloaked in uncertainty and controversy�
N O T E S
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to feedback from my professor at the time, 
Dr� Andrew Iarocci (now assistant professor 
at Western University in London, Ontario), 
as well as three anonymous reviewers from 
the Naval War College Review� Any remaining 
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